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Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark:
A Field Experiment
By GLENN W. HARRISON,M ORTEN I. LAU, AND MELONIE B. WILLIAMS*
Discount rates are often used in cost-beneﬁt
analysis. Whenever costs and beneﬁts for a
household or individual are spread over time, it
is essential that one calculate present-value
equivalents in order to undertake meaningful
comparisons. In most cases welfare analysts use
market rates as the basis for these present-value
calculations. Sensitivity analysis often consists
of varying the scalar discount rate up or down in
relation to market interest rates.
Since discount rates are a reﬂection of sub-
jective time preferences, one would expect a
priori that they could differ across different
individuals.
1 However, standard practice in in-
tertemporal welfare analyses is to assume that
those rates are (i) the same across households,
and (ii) the same for all time horizons. We elicit
individual discount rates from subjects in order
to test these two hypotheses. The ﬁrst hypothe-
sis is that discount rates for a given time horizon
do not differ with respect to sociodemographic
characteristics that characterize households in
our sample. The second hypothesis is that dis-
count rates for a given individual do not differ
across time horizons.
We use survey questions with real monetary
rewards to elicit individual discount rates and
demonstrate the methodological complementa-
rity between lab and ﬁeld experiments. The
survey questions are designed by Manbeth Col-
ler and Williams (1999), who elicit nominal
individual discount rates for university students
using controlled laboratory experiments.
2 We
apply their experimental procedures, but em-
ploy subjects that are normally encountered in
ﬁeld surveys. Our experiments were carried out
across Denmark for the Danish government,
using a nationally representative sample of 268
people between 19 and 75 years of age.
Our results indicate that nominal
3 discount
rates are constant over the one-year to three-
year horizons used in these experiments, and
that discount rates vary signiﬁcantly with re-
spect to several sociodemographic variables. On
the basis of these results one can assume con-
stant discount rates for speciﬁc household
types, but not the same rates across all
households.
In Section I we review the logic of our ex-
perimental design. Section II explains the ﬁeld * Harrison: Department of Economics, Moore School of
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gen, Denmark (e-mail: mol@cebr.dk); Williams: National
Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 1200 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
(MC 1809T), Washington, DC 20460 (e-mail: williams.
melonie@epamail.epa.gov). We are grateful to the Dan-
ish Ministry of Business and Industry for funding this
study, to Maribeth Coller, Ben Heijdra, and two referees
for comments. None of our employers or overlapping
generations are responsible for our conclusions.
1 We elicit discount rates for individuals. To the extent
that the characteristics of individuals are used to deﬁne
“representative households,” we can refer to the individual
and the household interchangeably. However, we remain
agnostic concerning the way in which the individual dis-
count rates of individual household members are aggregated
into one household discount rate, akin to a social discount
rate for the household as a small society.
2 Coller and Williams (1999) explain how their design
relates to ﬁndings in the extant experimental literature. We
review this discussion in our working paper, available at
http://dmsweb.badm.sc.edu/glenn/idr/dkidr.htm. This web
page also contains links to all experimental instructions,
data, and software to replicate our results. For the conve-
nience of Danish-challenged readers we also provide on this
web site an English translation of all instructions and ques-
tionnaires.
3 At the time of the experiments the inﬂation rate in
Denmark was just under 2 percent per annum, and had been
steady for several years. It rose to 3 percent per annum by
the end of the longest horizon used in our experiments. The
realized rates of inﬂation, taking the front-end delay into
account, were 0.3 percent, 1.2 percent, 3.2 percent, and
6.1 percent for the 6-, 12-, 24-, and 36-month horizons,
respectively.
1606experiments conducted, and Section III exam-
ines the results and relates them to those found
in the existing literature.
I. Experimental Design
The basic question used to elicit individual
discount rates is extremely simple: do you pre-
fer $100 today or $100  x tomorrow, where x
is some positive amount? If the subject prefers
the $100 today then we can infer that the dis-
count rate is higher than x percent per day;
otherwise, we can infer that it is x percent per
day or less. The format of our experiment
modiﬁes and extends this basic question in six
ways.
First, we pose a number of such questions to
each individual, each question varying x by
some amount. When x is zero we would obvi-
ously expect the individual to reject the option
of waiting for no rate of return. As we increase
x we would expect more individuals to take the
future income option. For any given individual,
the point at which he switches from choosing
the current income option to taking the future
income option provides a bound on his discount
rate. That is, if an individual takes the current
income option for all x from 0 to 10, then takes
the future income option for all x from 11 up to
100, we can infer that his discount rate lies
between 10 percent and 11 percent for this time
interval. The ﬁner the increments in x, the ﬁner
will we be able to pinpoint the discount rate of
the individual.
Second, we simultaneously pose several
questions with varying values of x, selecting
one question at random for actual payment after
all responses have been completed by the indi-
vidual. In this way the results from one question
do not generate income effects which might
inﬂuence the answers to other questions. Al-
though one could allow for these effects in the
later analysis, they could easily cause more
statistical problems than the extra data is
worth.
Third, we provide two future income options
rather than one “instant income” option and one
future income option. For example, we offer
$100 in one month and $100  x in 7 months,
interpreting the revealed discount rate as apply-
ing to a time horizon of 6 months. This avoids
the potential problem of the subject facing extra
transactions costs
4 with the future income op-
tion. If the delayed option were to involve
greater transactions costs, then the revealed dis-
count rate would include these subjective trans-
actions costs. By having both options entail
future income we hold these transactions costs
constant.
Fourth, we consider four possible time hori-
zons: 6 months, 12 months, 24 months, and 36
months. In one series of experiments subjects
were randomly assigned to a session in which
they were asked to consider one of these time
horizons. In these sessions we only elicited dis-
count rates pertaining to that horizon. In another
series, with different subjects, we ask the sub-
ject to state preferences over all four time hori-
zons, knowing that we will select one time
horizon at random for possible payment. A
comparison of these two series will allow some
evaluation of the effect of explicitly asking sub-
jects to consider multiple time horizons. It is
plausible that this could mitigate any tendency
for subjects to reveal time-inconsistent discount
rates.
Fifth, we elicit information from subjects to
help us identify what market rates of interest
they face. This information will be used to
allow for the possibility that their responses in
our surveys are censored by market rates. To
explain the censoring problem, assume that you
value a cold beer at $3, which is to say that if
you had to pay $3 for one beer you would. If I
ask you whether or not you are willing to pay
$2.50 for a lab beer, your response to me will
depend on whether or not there is a market price
of ﬁeld beer
5 lower than $2.50. If the market
price of the ﬁeld beer is $2.00, and you know
that you can buy a beer outside the lab at this
price, then you would never rationally reveal to
me that you would pay $2.50 for my lab beer. In
this case we say that your response is censored
by the market price (Harrison, 1992, p. 1432).
Fortunately, there are simple statistical proce-
dures for allowing for this possibility, and we
employ those in our statistical analysis.
4 Including the possibility of default by the experimenter.
5 Assume further that a beer in the lab is the same
product as a beer in the ﬁeld.
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applies here. Consider a subject with a true
individual discount rate (IDR) of 30 percent. In
the absence of ﬁeld substitutes for lab incen-
tives, we would expect this subject to choose to
save in the lab when the lab instrument provides
a rate of return of 30 percent or higher. Now
assume that this subject can borrow in the ﬁeld
at a rate of 14 percent. Although she demands at
least 30 percent interest to delay consumption
and save in the lab, at rates between 14 percent
and 30 percent she is better off borrowing in the
ﬁeld at 14 percent and not delaying consump-
tion in the ﬁeld, leaving the money in the lab
earning 14 percent or more, and repaying the
ﬁeld debt at the time she collects from the
experimenter. In this case, the subject should
rationally choose to invest in the lab when the
lab instrument provides a rate of return of 14
percent or more. Hence, censoring would imply
that the true IDR could actually be greater than
or equal to the observed borrowing rate when
we observe lab investment responses that sug-
gest that the IDR is equal to the borrowing rate.
6
In other words, if we ignored the possibility of
censoring of lab responses we would incorrectly
infer that this subject had an IDR of 14 percent.
Instead, we can only infer from these lab re-
sponses that the subject has a true IDR between
14 percent and . The problem is symmetric for
censoring with respect to savings rates, al-
though less signiﬁcant empirically.
7
The implication of allowing for censoring is
that we cannot presume that the “raw” re-
sponses in the lab are unbiased indicators of the
true IDR of the subject. Moreover, if we ignored
ﬁeld censoring then we could easily be led to
think that we were measuring responses with
more precision than would be warranted.
Sixth, we provide respondents with the inter-
est rates associated with the delayed payment
option. This is an important control feature if
ﬁeld investments are priced in terms of interest
rates. If subjects are attempting to compare the
lab investment to their ﬁeld options, this feature
may serve to reduce comparison errors since
now both lab and ﬁeld options are priced in the
same metric.
8
II. The Danish Experiments
A. Sample
In 1996 the Danish Ministry of Business and
Industry contracted with the Danish Social Re-
search Institute (SFI, after the Danish name
Socialforskningsinstituttet) to undertake the
ﬁeld surveys.
9 The ﬁnal surveys were con-
ducted between June 16 and July 8, 1997,
throughout Denmark.
The sample population consisted of a random
selection from individuals 19–75 years old who
had participated all three times in the European
6 When the subject reports an IDR interval that exceeds
the borrowing rate that we calculate for the subject, we
assume that there are subjective and unobserved transac-
tions costs such that the true (unobserved) market rate for
the subject is equal to the lower bound of the reported
interval. The subject’s responses are then treated statisti-
cally as being censored at that inferred borrowing rate.
7 Consider, for example, a subject with a true IDR of 3
percent. In the absence of ﬁeld substitutes for lab incentives,
we would again expect this subject to choose to invest in the
lab instrument as long as it provides a return of 3 percent or
higher. Now suppose that this subject can save in the ﬁeld
at a rate of 10 percent. Although she would be willing to
save at 3 percent, at rates between 3 percent and 10 percent
she is better off investing in the ﬁeld and refusing to invest
in the lab. Hence censoring would imply that the true IDR
could actually be less than or equal to the observed savings
rate when we observe lab investment responses that suggest
that the IDR is close to the savings rate.
8 Coller and Williams (1999) suggest that behavior in
these studies may be affected by uncontrolled factors other
than time preferences that may help explain observed anom-
alies. They suggest that subjects may attempt to arbitrage
between lab and ﬁeld investment opportunities, but may
make mistakes in comparing these opportunities because the
lab and ﬁeld investments are “priced” in different terms.
Lab investments are priced in dollar interest (the difference
between the early and later payments), while ﬁeld invest-
ments are priced in terms of annual and effective interest
rates. A rational subject should never choose to postpone
payment in the laboratory at interest rates lower than those
she can receive in the external market, for example, but she
may make mistakes in converting dollar interest to an in-
terest rate (or vice versa) for the purposes of comparison.
The use of hypothetical or small payments is likely to
exacerbate this problem because of the cognitive costs as-
sociated with the subject’s arbitrage problem; at lower
stakes subjects are likely to expend less cognitive effort on
getting the comparison right.
9 At the time, Harrison was Director of the MobiDK
Project, within the Ministry. Lau was a Senior Researcher
with the MobiDK Project.
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previously conducted by SFI. These persons
were chosen because they had some experience
with respect to economic surveys, and because
we could expect a high response rate. The sam-
ple was constructed in two steps.
The 275 municipalities in Denmark were pro-
portionally stratiﬁed with respect to the number
of persons between 19 and 75 years of age on
January 1, 1997. Copenhagen and Aarhus, the
two largest municipalities, had their own stra-
tum due to their size. Most of the other munic-
ipalities were divided into 23 strata. Some
remote municipalities, primarily tiny islands,
were not represented in the sample because the
population is relatively small and the subjects
would spend too much time traveling to the
experimental session.
The 27 sessions were divided equally across
geographic locations with 5, 10, and 15 partic-
ipants in each experiment. In turn, the 27 ses-
sions were located such that the number of
participants at the experiments correspond to
the relative size of the population in the given
stratum. For example, approximately 11 percent
of the population between 19 and 75 years of
age live in Copenhagen, and three sessions with
a total of 30 participants were held in Copen-
hagen, which corresponds to 11.1 percent of the
total sample size.
10
Most strata consist of several municipalities,
and the strata were constructed according to
trafﬁc connections. The sessions were held in
the evening to facilitate attendance by working
subjects. It was important that the participants
not spend too much time on traveling in order to
join the experiments. In some cases, it was
necessary to divide a given stratum into two
subgroups, since the distance between some po-
tential participants and the location of the ses-
sion would otherwise be too great. Accordingly,
a random draw from the subgroups was made,
weighing the two subgroups with respect to the
relative size of the population between 19 and
75 years of age.
The interviewers initially contracted 6, 12, or
17 persons, the number depending on the spe-
ciﬁc session and assuming a show-up rate of
approximately 80 percent. If a respondent de-
clined to participate, the interviewers contacted
a “stand-in” roughly the same age. Hence, either
6, 12, or 17 persons were conﬁrmed before the
experiment took place. However, some persons
did not show up at the sessions and the actual
number of participants varied accordingly.
A total of 268 subjects participated in the
experiments. The sample was designed to be
equally split between single-horizon and multiple-
horizon treatments, and then equally split by
time horizon within the single-horizon treat-
ments. All subjects were randomly assigned
to treatment condition.
11 The sample was rep-
resentative of the adult population of Den-
mark, due to the stratiﬁed sampling methods
employed.
B. Primary Experimental Instructions
Apart from logistical correspondence be-
tween SFI and the subject concerning atten-
dance at the session, the only information that
the subject received was from the survey instru-
ment administered in the experiment. The initial
contact letter to the subjects posed the general
nature of the task, and informed subjects that
they would be paid 500 DKK after participating
in the survey and that one subject would receive
at least 3,000 DKK. No other details of the
experiment were provided until the subjects ar-
rived at the session.
10 It is possible that some subjects were confused as to
whether they lived in Copenhagen or Greater Copenhagen,
so we have tended to lump these together in the statistical
analysis. The area called Copenhagen in the survey covers
three communes: Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, and Gentofte.
The total population in this area is 600,000 people, which is
around 11 percent of the total population. Three sessions in
Copenhagen with 27 subjects in total matches this share
well. Some of the sessions referring to Zealand cover some
of the suburbs in Copenhagen. The population in Copenha-
gen, including all suburbs, is 1.35 million, which is around
26 percent of the total population. We suspect that some
subjects who live in the suburbs write that they live in
Copenhagen instead of the Greater Copenhagen area.
11 Due to the vagaries of no-shows, the actual sample
differs slightly from this design. There were 118 subjects in
the 15 single-horizon experiments, and 150 subjects in the
12 multiple-horizon experiments. Within the single-horizon
experiments there were 26, 32, 31, and 29 subjects, respec-
tively, in the 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month
treatments.
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jects were given the following information:
One person in this room will be randomly
chosen to receive a large sum of money. If
you are the individual chosen to receive
this money (the “Assignee”), you will
have a choice of two payment options;
Option A or Option B. If you choose
Option B you will receive a sum of
money 7 months from today. If you
choose Option A, you will receive a sum
of money 1 month from today, but this
Option (A) will pay a smaller amount
than Option B.
Subjects were given payoff tables as illus-
trated in Table 1. They were told that they must
choose between payment Options A and B for
each of the 20 payoff alternatives. Option A was
3,000 DKK in all sessions. Option B paid 3,000
DKK  X DKK, where X ranged from annual
rates of return of 2.5 percent to 50 percent on
the principal of 3,000 DKK, compounded quar-
terly to be consistent with general Danish bank-
ing practices on overdraft accounts. The payoff
tables provided the annual and annual effective
interest rates for each payment option and the
experimental instructions deﬁned these terms
by way of example. Subjects were then told that
a single payment option would be chosen at
random for payment, and that a single subject
would be chosen at random to be paid his pre-
ferred payment option for the chosen payoff
alternative. The payment mechanism was ex-
plained as follows:
HOW WILL THE ASSIGNEE BE PAID?
The Assignee will receive a certiﬁcate
which is redeemable under the conditions
dictated by his or her chosen payment op-
tion under the selected payoff alternative.
This certiﬁcate is guaranteed by the Social
Research Institute. The Social Research In-
stitute will automatically redeem the certif-
icate for a Social Research Institute check,
which the Assignee will receive given his or
her chosen payment option under the se-
lected payoff alternative. Please note that all
payments are subject to income tax, and
information on all payments to participants
will be given to the tax authorities by the
Social Research Institute.
Finally, prior to the choice task, the experimenter
illustrated the randomization devices in a trial

















(circle A or B)
1 3,000 DKK 3,038 DKK 2.5 2.52 A B
2 3,000 DKK 3,075 DKK 5 5.09 A B
3 3,000 DKK 3,114 DKK 7.5 7.71 A B
4 3,000 DKK 3,152 DKK 10 10.38 A B
5 3,000 DKK 3,190 DKK 12.5 13.1 A B
6 3,000 DKK 3,229 DKK 15 15.87 A B
7 3,000 DKK 3,268 DKK 17.5 18.68 A B
8 3,000 DKK 3,308 DKK 20 21.55 A B
9 3,000 DKK 3,347 DKK 22.5 24.47 A B
10 3,000 DKK 3,387 DKK 25 27.44 A B
11 3,000 DKK 3,427 DKK 27.5 30.47 A B
12 3,000 DKK 3,467 DKK 30 33.55 A B
13 3,000 DKK 3,507 DKK 32.5 36.68 A B
14 3,000 DKK 3,548 DKK 35 39.87 A B
15 3,000 DKK 3,589 DKK 37.5 43.11 A B
16 3,000 DKK 3,630 DKK 40 46.41 A B
17 3,000 DKK 3,671 DKK 42.5 49.77 A B
18 3,000 DKK 3,713 DKK 45 53.18 A B
19 3,000 DKK 3,755 DKK 47.5 56.65 A B
20 3,000 DKK 3,797 DKK 50 60.18 A B
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candies as payoffs. The trial Assignee was paid his
candies at the end of the trial experiment, to illus-
trate the concrete nature of the payoffs.
The instructions for the 12-month, 24-month,
and 36-month horizon experiments were iden-
tical except for the obvious changes. The in-
structions for the multiple-horizons sessions
were similar, with the single change that the
subject was asked to provide responses for all
four time horizons. All four time horizons were
presented simultaneously to the subject, who
could respond to them in any order.
12 One time
horizon was then selected for possible payment,
and the remaining procedures were identical to
the single-horizon sessions.
Across all time horizons, payoffs to any one
subject could range from 3,000 DKK up to
12,333 DK. The exchange rate in mid-1997 was
approximately 6.7 DKK per U.S. dollar, so this
range converts to $450 and $1,840.
C. Additional Experimental Questionnaires
In addition to the primary elicitation task, we
collected information from subjects on a variety
of sociodemographic characteristics. Speciﬁ-
cally, we collected information on age, gender,
size of town the subject resided in, type of
residence, primary occupation during the last 12
months, highest level of education, household
type (viz., marital status and presence of
younger or older children), number of people
employed in the household, total household in-
come before taxes, disposable household in-
come, whether the subject is a smoker, and the
number of cigarettes smoked per day.
We also elicited information on a number of
ﬁnancial variables to help us identify the market
circumstances within which the discount rate
responses should be viewed. Speciﬁcally, we
collected information on whether the subject
had various accounts (e.g., checking account,
credit card, line of credit), the annual interest
rate on those accounts, and the current balance.
We also collected information on the subject’s
perception of his or her chances of obtaining a
loan, line of credit, or credit card.
III. Results
Our null hypotheses are that the discount rates
for given time horizons do not differ across house-
holds, and that the discount rates for given house-
holds do not differ across time horizons.
A. Statistical Analysis
After removing subjects that gave incomplete
or inconsistent responses, the ﬁnal sample con-
sists of 109 observations spread across the four
single-horizon sessions, and 132 observations
on the multiple-horizon sessions.
13 The statisti-
cal analysis takes into account four features of
these data.
14 First, we account for the fact that
we observe only interval-censored responses,
rather than precise values of the IDR. Thus a
subject that switched from A to B in Option 8
would be viewed as choosing an annual effec-
tive rate in the interval (18.68 percent, 21.55
percent]. Second, we account for the stratiﬁca-
tion of our national sample, as described earlier.
Third, we account for the “panel data” feature
of our experiments in which some subjects pro-
vided four sets of responses rather than just
one.
15 Finally, we account for the possibility
that market responses are censored by market
savings and borrowing rates.
16
12 The literal sequence of the time-horizon payoff tables
in the survey instrument was the natural one, with the
6-month horizon coming ﬁrst.
13 An inconsistent response is one in which the subject
switched between A and B more than once. This occurred in
only 3 percent of the responses, reﬂecting 4 percent of the
subjects. The remaining sample reductions are from sub-
jects that neglected to answer some core demographic ques-
tion.
14 Because of these statistical issues, we refer to the
discount rates that are predicted by the regression model as
the elicited discount rates. That is, some statistical analysis
is needed to infer the discount rate that is implied by the raw
response to the experimental instrument.
15 This feature amounts to a multistage sampling design
in which there are up to four observations for each “primary
sampling unit,” which in our case is the individual subject.
The regression procedure we use allows for any amount of
correlation within the observations for each primary sam-
pling unit. See StataCorp (2001, User’s Guide, p. 324).
16 We estimate an interval regression model recognizing
the features of the complex survey design used, employing
version 7 of Stata documented in StataCorp (2001).
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statistical model are deﬁned as follows:
T6, T12, T24, and T36: binary indicators
17 of
the 6-month, 12-month, 24-month, and 36-
month time horizons, respectively;
MULTIPLE: binary indicator that the subject
gave responses in a multiple-horizon session;
FEMALE: binary indicator if the subject was a
female;
YOUNG: binary indicator if the subject was
less than 30 years old;
MIDDLE: binary indicator if the subject was
between 40 and 50 years old;
OLD: binary indicator if the subject was greater
than 50 years old;
MIDDLE1: disposable household income in
1996 between 100,000 and 199,999 Danish
kroner;
MIDDLE2: disposable household income in
1996 between 200,000 and 299,999 Danish
kroner;
RICH: disposable household income in 1996
greater than or equal to 300,000 Danish
kroner;
SKILLED: binary indicator that the subject has
completed more than the basic primary and
secondary education in Denmark (i.e., com-
pleted more than “Basic school, General up-
per secondary education, and/or Vocational
upper secondary education”);
STUDENT: binary indicator that being a stu-
dent was the primary occupation in the last
year;
LONGEDU: binary indicator that the subject
has completed some substantial higher edu-
cation (referred to in Denmark as “medium-
cycle or longer-cycle higher education”);
COPEN: binary indicator that the subject lives
in Copenhagen, including “Greater Copenha-
gen and its suburbs”;
TOWN: binary indicator that the subject lives in
a town with 10,000 or more inhabitants other
than Copenhagen;
OWNER: binary indicator that the subject lives
in an apartment or house that the subject
owns;
RETIRED: binary indicator that the subject is
retired;
UNEMP: binary indicator that the subject is
unemployed;
SINGLE: binary indicator that the subject lives
alone, where the subjects were told that a
“household is an economic unit, deﬁned as a
group of persons who live in the same resi-
dence where each person contributes to gen-
eral expenditures”;
KIDS: binary indicator that the subject lives
with children;
GSIZE: variable indicating the size of the group
that attended the session that the subject par-
ticipated in;
BALANCE: binary indicator that the subject
carries a positive balance in a line of credit
18
or credit card; and
CHANCES: binary indicator that the subject
believes that the chances of getting a line of
credit or credit card approved if the subject
went to a bank are poor (less than 75 percent
likely).
The characteristics employed in our statistical
analysis are generally those also used by Den-
marks Statistics in its household expenditure
surveys.
19
The regression results are presented in Ta-
ble 2. The overall signiﬁcance of the regression
equation is provided by an adjusted Wald test
statistic of the null hypothesis that all coefﬁ-
cients other than the constant are equal to zero.
We reject this null hypothesis at any standard
level.
The average discount rate elicited over all
subjects is approximately 28 percent. Before
17 As a matter of convention we code all binary indica-
tors with the Boolean interpretation in which a 1 denotes
“true” and 0 denotes “false.” For example, T6  1i ft h e
observation pertains to the 6-month horizon, and 0 other-
wise.
18 It is common for Danes to carry a prearranged per-
sonal line of credit at a bank, so we view this as being
similar to the credit card balances that Americans might
carry in terms of convenience of access.
19 These are standard classiﬁcations, but also have the
advantage of allowing us to map the results into other
databases and models that use these classiﬁcations for wel-
fare analyses. Speciﬁcally, we plan to use these elicited
rates to extend the calibration of “generational accounts” for
Denmark and computable general-equilibrium models for
Denmark that represent households as intertemporal utility
maximizers.
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imental treatments, the absolute level of the
elicited rate should be noted. Relative to the
extensive experimental literature in which dis-
count rates are elicited with a variety of hypo-
thetical questions, this average is actually quite
low. On the other hand, compared to discount
rates popularly used in welfare analyses (roughly
between 3 percent and 10 percent) these rates
seem relatively high. Several factors might ac-
count for the absolute magnitude of the elicited
rates.
First, despite our extensive attempts to en-
courage credibility, the subjects might have
doubted that we would actually follow through
on the payments.
20 These are, after all, artiﬁcial
and constructed payment options. This uncer-
tainty could plausibly have encouraged subjects
to view these as “risky” prospects, in turn en-
couraging them to require a higher rate of return
before investing for any longer time period.
This particular credibility effect would likely
be additive on the elicited discount rates over
all time horizons, increasing all elicited dis-
count rates by some ﬁxed amount (e.g., 10
percentage points) to offset the “default risk.”
The reason that this effect would be constant
across time horizons is that the risk of default
would not be likely to vary with the time
horizon.
Second, since we elicited discount rates over
real monetary amounts and operated with a ﬁ-
nite budget, we were forced to constrain the
amounts of money involved. Compared to many
laboratory experiments with real payments, our
ﬁeld experiments use quite large amounts.
Nonetheless, the subjects may have perceived
these as small amounts of money. Whether or
not that leads to a change in revealed discount
rates is an open question, but a priori folklore
amongst experimenters suggests that subjects
might not take forgone income seriously if it
falls below some subjective threshold. This
20 It is true that the Ministry of Business and Industry
changed it’s name to the Ministry of Trade and Industry
within the time horizon of the instruments being proffered,
but this would not have been known at the time the exper-
iments were conducted, and was largely a superﬁcial
change.
TABLE 2—REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DISCOUNT RATE RESPONSES
Variable Coefﬁcient Standard error tP  t 90-percent conﬁdence interval
T6 34.86076 7.908359 4.41 0.000 21.8014 47.92012
T12 28.95233 7.976701 3.63 0.000 15.78012 42.12454
T24 27.44078 8.018661 3.42 0.001 14.19928 40.68228
T36 27.87162 8.046035 3.46 0.001 14.58491 41.15832
MULTIPLE 0.8359218 2.228436 0.38 0.708 2.843975 4.515818
FEMALE 1.014945 2.713695 0.37 0.709 3.466278 5.496168
YOUNG 1.094671 3.934629 0.28 0.781 7.592065 5.402722
MIDDLE 0.1785973 3.446215 0.05 0.959 5.512261 5.869455
OLD 0.4595653 3.754661 0.12 0.903 6.659771 5.740641
MIDDLE1 1.305936 3.674648 0.36 0.723 7.374014 4.762143
MIDDLE2 3.214197 4.309141 0.75 0.456 10.33004 3.901641
RICH 5.341135 4.102213 1.30 0.194 12.11527 1.432997
SKILLED 0.7426614 3.275909 0.23 0.821 4.666965 6.152288
STUDENT 4.204929 5.285858 0.80 0.427 4.523798 12.93366
LONGEDU 9.202757 3.174322 2.90 0.004 14.44463 3.960884
COPEN 1.13076 3.209827 0.35 0.725 6.431263 4.169742
TOWN 3.171888 2.845343 1.11 0.266 1.52673 7.870505
OWNER 3.764708 3.030948 1.24 0.215 8.769821 1.240406
RETIRED 12.37832 5.048285 2.45 0.015 4.041905 20.71473
UNEMP 7.769304 4.437314 1.75 0.081 15.0968 0.4418082
SINGLE 2.401655 3.009327 0.80 0.426 7.371065 2.567755
KIDS 0.2497801 3.11824 0.08 0.936 4.899481 5.399041
GSIZE 0.0238708 0.3650134 0.07 0.948 0.5788889 0.6266305
BALANCE 1.829445 2.61292 0.70 0.485 2.485364 6.144253
CHANCES 7.648062 3.996732 1.91 0.057 1.048115 14.24801
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incentives offered by forgoing near-term con-
sumption in our experiments.
We attempt to control for the effect of vary-
ing incentives by including the variable GSIZE
in our regression model. Expected payments to
subjects varied with the size of the group they
participated in, since this (inversely) scaled the
probability that the subject would be selected as
the one person to actually play out his choices
for real payment. By controlling for this vari-
able in the regression model, and generating
predictions for the case in which group size was
counterfactually assumed to be one, we can
ascertain what the regression model predicts
would be the elicited discount rate if the prob-
ability of being selected was one.
B. Elicited Discount Rates
The regression results are presented in Table
2. Each of the four time horizon treatments
(denoted T6, T12, T24, and T36) generates an
equation intercept, while the remainder of the
coefﬁcients can be directly interpreted as the
marginal effect of each variable. An alternative
way to view the effects of demographics is to
generate predicted discount rates for everyone
in the sample and then to stratify these predicted
rates. These results are shown in Table 3. The
demographic results in Table 3 show the effect
of varying the indicated variable and all other
characteristics that are associated with it. Thus,
if women are better educated on average than
men in Denmark, the effect of sex in Table
3 will include the effect of this difference in
education whereas the marginal effect on that
coefﬁcient in Table 2 will not. We report both
sets of demographic breakdowns since each is
of policy interest.
Table 2 indicates that there was some differ-
ence in the estimated discount rates for the
6-month horizon compared to the others. Vary-
ing the time horizon appears to have no effect
on discount rates for the 12- to 36-month time
horizons, while rates for the 6-month time ho-
rizon are roughly 6 percentage points higher.
21
An F-test conﬁrms these claims. The only de-
mographic characteristics that appear to matter
in Table 2 are (i) the length of education, which
is associated with a discount rate over 9 per-
centage points lower than otherwise; (ii) retire-
ment, which is associated with a discount rate
over 12 percentage points higher than other-
wise; and (iii) unemployment, which is associ-
ated with a discount rate just over 7 percentage
points lower than otherwise.
22 In addition, if the
individual perceives that they have a poor
chance of getting a loan or credit card approved
at a bank, their discount rate is over 7 percent-
age points higher.
Although the individual coefﬁcients do not
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the conven-
tional levels, we also observe a lowering of
estimated discount rates as incomes rise. How-
ever, this marginal effect could be corre-
lated with investments in education. For this
reason it is appropriate to examine the fully
stratiﬁed results in Table 3, which show the
joint effects of each demographic character-
istic and those other characteristics correlated
with it.
Table 3 generates several interesting re-
sults,
23 complementing the marginal effects of
Table 2:
● The overall individual discount rate in Den-
mark is estimated to be 28.1 percent. This
reﬂects the stratiﬁcation of our sample in
order to obtain an efﬁcient estimate of the
national average. Figure 1 displays the distri-
21 The standard error of prediction from this statistical
model is 6.5 percentage points. The median is very close to
the mean, since the distribution of estimated discount rates
is relatively symmetric. Hence we refer to mean estimates
throughout.
22 In each case we can plausibly entertain hypotheses
that allow the causality to go both ways. In fact, one of the
motivating policy forces behind our survey was a concern
that Danes did not invest enough in education. Our results
suggest that those that do invest in education may do so
because they simply have a lower discount rate, and are
more willing to trade off near-term costs for longer-term
payoffs.
23 The total sample in Table 3 is listed as 696, even
though some observations were deleted in the regression
analysis in Table 2. The reason is that the complete sample
is utilized when adjusting the standard errors for the sample
stratiﬁcation.
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roughly normal.
● The discount rates for men and women ap-
pear to be identical, conﬁrming the marginal
effects in Table 2. This result is particularly
notable since many other characteristics vary
with sex.
● Discount rates appear to decline with age, at
least after middle age.
● There does appear to be a signiﬁcant lowering
of the discount rate for higher income indi-
viduals, when we allow these individuals to
“carry with them” the other characteristics
they typically have, such as more education.
TABLE 3—AVERAGE ELICITED DISCOUNT RATES STRATIFIED BY MAJOR DEMOGRAPHICS
Demographic
characteristic Estimate Standard error 90-percent conﬁdence interval Observations
ALL 28.1464 0.53537 27.26233 29.03048 696
Male 28.06626 0.76262 26.80692 29.3256 336
Female 28.22121 0.7667374 26.95507 29.48735 360
Young 28.71521 0.9551633 27.13791 30.2925 146
Middle (30–40) 28.35924 0.8708021 26.92125 29.79722 199
Middle (41–50) 25.05474 1.065985 23.29444 26.81503 158
Old 30.02767 1.256172 27.95331 32.10203 193
Poor 32.92452 1.014352 31.24948 34.59955 171
Lower middle 30.08146 0.676202 28.96482 31.19809 280
Upper middle 22.68201 0.7520371 21.44014 23.92387 126
Rich 22.51315 1.251744 20.4461 24.5802 119
Unskilled 31.42633 0.7387784 30.20636 32.6463 295
Skilled 25.73349 0.6889163 24.59586 26.87113 401
Not a student 27.48244 0.5661343 26.54756 28.41732 621
Student 33.64402 1.291917 31.51063 35.7774 75
Less educated 30.9838 0.547016 30.0805 31.88711 506
More educated 20.58996 0.7659382 19.32514 21.85479 190
Not Copenhagen 28.50351 0.5887187 27.53133 29.47568 531
Copenhagen 26.99719 1.236626 24.9551 29.03927 165
Not in a town 26.79067 0.7654368 25.52668 28.05466 388
Town 29.85428 0.7091534 28.68323 31.02533 308
Not an owner 31.66546 0.7322497 30.45627 32.87465 291
Owner 25.6179 0.6893576 24.47953 26.75626 405
Active 26.52264 0.4946091 25.70587 27.3394 603
Retired 38.67471 1.029985 36.97386 40.37557 93
Working 28.38739 0.5465463 27.48486 29.28992 655
Unemployed 24.29656 1.699674 21.48983 27.1033 41
Married 27.47882 0.7236279 26.28387 28.67377 453
Single 29.39091 0.8189498 28.03855 30.74328 243
No children 28.89642 0.7119442 27.72076 30.07208 431
Have children 26.92657 0.8296289 25.55658 28.29657 265
No balance 28.19078 0.7941139 26.87943 29.50213 387
Carries a balance 28.09083 0.7535453 26.84647 29.33518 309
Good chances 27.10611 0.5349895 26.22266 27.98956 611
Poor chances 35.62428 1.365615 33.36919 37.87937 85
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discount rates that are over 10 percentage
points lower than those in the lowest range.
This difference between Table 3 and Table
2 illustrates the potential importance of ex-
amining demographic effects both ways.
● Table 3 also shows a large difference between
the discount rates of skilled and unskilled
individuals, with those that have skills having
a signiﬁcantly lower discount rate.
● Perhaps surprisingly, students have a higher
discount rate than nonstudents.
● The importance of the extent of educa-
tion from Table 2, measured by variable
LONGEDU, is conﬁrmed in Table 3: those
with longer investments in education are
also those with substantially lower discount
rates.
● Ownership of a house is associated with hav-
ing a lower discount rate, perhaps because
home ownership is correlated with other de-
mographics associated with lower discount
rates, such as income and having children.
● Retired individuals have higher discount
rates, conﬁrming the marginal effect from
Table 2.
● The unemployed have lower discount rates
than the employed.
● Finally, poor perceived chances of being
turned down for a loan or credit card by a
bank are associated with the individual hav-
ing much higher discount rates, as one
would expect. This result also appeared
in Table 2, and seems to cut across other
demographics.
C. Comparison to the Literature
There have been several attempts to estimate
discount rates for individuals in ﬁeld settings
using ﬁnancial instruments.
24 All of them ﬁnd
relatively high discount rates.
Lawrence M. Ausubel (1991, Table 11, p. 70)
shows that nearly three-quarters of those hold-
ing credit cards in banks he surveyed do not pay
off their balance on time and avoid ﬁnance
charges, despite the fact that those ﬁnance
charges amount to roughly 19 percent per an-
num. We ﬁnd that subjects in our experiments
that hold comparable balances in Denmark have
essentially the same discount rates as those that
do not hold such balances (see Tables 2 and 3).
John T. Warner and Saul Pleeter (2001) esti-
mate individual discount rates for a large num-
ber of U.S. military personnel who were offered
voluntary separation options. One option was an
initial lump-sum payment, and the other was an
annuity. They estimate (Table 6, p. 48) that
ofﬁcers had an average discount rate of between
10 percent and 19 percent, depending on the
statistical speciﬁcation assumed, and that en-
listed personnel had discount rates between 35
percent and 54 percent.
Although these ﬁndings refer to selected
segments of the population, albeit large seg-
ments with a diverse range of sociodemo-
graphic characteristics, they suggest that the
level of discount rates that we ﬁnd for the
Danish population is consistent with other ﬁeld
evidence.
IV. Conclusions
We demonstrate that it is possible to elicit
discount rates from individuals in the ﬁeld using
real economic commitments, and that those dis-
24 There are also numerous studies estimating large dis-
count rates implicit in the purchase of alternative consumer
durables, and numerous laboratory studies using student
subjects that utilize ﬁnancial instruments also ﬁnd large
discount rates. Henry Ruderman et al. (1986) review the
former, and Coller and Williams (1999) review the latter.
The only laboratory experiments with lower discount rates,
that we are aware of, are those of Coller and Williams
(1999), whose design we employed here. They ﬁnd annual
rates for American college students in the 15-percent to
18-percent range.
FIGURE 1. ESTIMATED DISCOUNT RATES
FOR THE DANISH POPULATION
1616 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW DECEMBER 2002count rates are in an a priori plausible range.
There are variations in discount rates across
some sociodemographic characteristics of the
Danish population, implying that intertemporal
welfare evaluations for those household groups
should take these differences into account. On
the other hand, elicited discount rates do not
vary with respect to the time horizon used here
beyond one year, consistent with the use of
constant discount rates for given household
types for those horizons.
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